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RICHARD PRINCE, AUTHOR OF THE CATCHER IN THE
RYE: TRANSFORMING FAIR USE ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION

One day in the fall of 2011, a man unrolled a blanket on a
sidewalk by Central Park, laid out multiple copies of a book, and
started selling them for forty dollars apiece. 1 The man was the no
torious appropriation artist Richard Prince, and the books for sale
were near-duplicates of an early edition of The Catcher in the Rye
2
by J.D. Salinger. They were "near-duplicates" for one very obvi
ous reason: on the dustcover, title page, and copyright page,
Prince's name appeared in place of Salinger's.3 As it turns out,
these books were part of Prince's latest art project-500 meticu
lously constructed copies of The Catcher in the Rye using thick,
high quality paper meant to mimic the 1951 original, the same
cover art as the original, and most astonishingly, the same text as
1
the original (in its entirety).
Prince's appropriation of The Catcher in the Rye was
especially at that time-a daring artistic choice. 5 He had just lost

l. See Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince's Latest Act of Appropriation: The Catcher
in the Rye, POETRY FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/

2012/04/richard-princes-latest-act-of-appropriation-the-catcher-in-the-rye/.
2. Several articles have referred to the Richard Prince versions as duplicates of the
first edition (and not only an early edition) of The Catcher in the Rye by J. D. Salinger. See,
e.g., id.; Thomas Hawk, Richard Prince on Appropriating "The Catcher in the Rye",
THOMAS HAWK'S DIGI'l'AL CONNECTION (June 17, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://thomashawk.
com/2013/06/richard-prince-on-appropriating-the-catcher-in-the-rye.html. For a variety of
bibliographic reasons this is incorrect. For instance, true first editions of The Catcher in
the Rye had a photograph of J.D. Salinger on the rear panel of the dust jacket. First Edi
tion Criteria and Points to Identify The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger, FEDPO.COM,
http://www.fedpo.com/BookDetail.php?bk=213 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). In later printings
this feature was dropped. Michael Lieberman, Richard Prince: Book Pirate?, BOOK PA'l'IWL
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://bookpatrol.net/richard-prince-book-pirate/. The Prince copies have a
blank rear panel. See id. (noting that Prince's version used the second issue dust jacket
which lacks J.D. Salinger's photo).
3. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
4. See Hawk, supra note 2.
5. See Goldsmith, supra note 1.
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a copyright case several months earlier in front of a federal dis
trict court.6 He had been found guilty of misappropriating for his
visual art series, Canal Zone, multiple photographs of Rastafari
ans published by Patrick Cariou, a relatively unknown photogra
pher.7 However, with his The Catcher in the Rye project, Prince
was appropriating the work of an author who was far from un
known. Indeed, few twentieth century novels are better known
than The Catcher in the Rye, and few authors have more fiercely
defended their copyrighted works than J.D. Salinger. 8 Salinger
successfully sued to enjoin the publication of a derivative work of
fiction that used characters and plot lines from The Catcher in the
Rye and a critical biography that quoted liberally from un
published letters he had written. 9 At first blush, Richard Prince's
appropriation appears so egregious by comparison to these two
infringers that Prince seems to be "practically begging the estate
of Salinger to sue him" (though, as of this writing the estate has
yet to do so).10
It is striking that in both of his copyright infringement victo
ries, Salinger won after overcoming the "credible fair use defens
es" of the accused infringers.11 The fair use doctrine protects cer
tain copying of original expression by allowing "courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos
ter."12 And yet, what constitutes the fair use of copyrighted mate
rial has never been strictly defined either by the courts or by the

6. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7. Patrick Cariou had published Yes Rasta, a book of photographs, in 2000. See id. at
343, 355. The decision of the Southern District Court of New York would later be reversed
in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 695 (2d Cir. 2013); see infra Part II.B.
8. See Kate O'Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger's Literary
Estate, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 21-22 (2012).
9. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71-72, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
Frederick Colting had infringed on Salinger's copyrighted material in The Catcher in the
Rye with his derivative work, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, which features
Holden Caulfield as an old man); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that biographer, Ian Hamilton, had infringed Salinger's copyright in cer
tain unpublished letters by quoting them extensively).
10. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
11. O'Neill, supra note 8, at 20-21.
12. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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Copyright Act of 1976. 13 The statute does, however, list four fac
tors courts must consider when presented with fair use as a de
fense to copyright infringement: (1) the purpose of the use; (2) the
nature of the source; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
source that is used; and (4) the potential impact of the use on the
market for the source. 14 This list is non-exclusive and seemingly
designed to give judges broad leeway to determine fair use on a
case-by-case basis. 10
The Copyright Act's lack of direction on fair use has led to hap
hazard application by the courts, which tend to overemphasize
one or the other of the factors while ignoring or marginalizing the
others. 16 A framework for applying the factors consistent with the
concept behind fair use is necessary to ensure that the goal of
copyright protection, to promote "the Progress of Science and use
ful Arts," is met rather than frustrated. 17 At the heart of fair use
rests the concept of transformative use; that is, in order for crea
tive expression to be copied and used fairly, it must somehow be
transformed. 18 That is all well and good, but determining what
degree of transformation is necessary to rise to the level of fair
use has not proven such an easy task for the courts.
When they have considered transformation at all, courts have
read the first of the four fair use factors-the purpose of the use
as the factor determining whether the copying of the source's cre
ative expression has been transformative. 19 This is reductive. Ra
ther than considering it as a single factor, courts should fully in
tegrate the concept of transformative use into the analysis of fair
13. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A]
(Matthew Bender rev.ed., 2014).
14. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2012).
15. See NIMMER, supra note 13. Though the list is non-exclusive, courts have not come
up with any other factors to include.
16. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
17. See U.S. CONST.art.I, § 8, cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
575 (1994).
18. See Pierre N.Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990) (finding that the first factor "raises the question of justification ....This question
is vitally important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the heart of the fair user's Clise .. ..
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to
what extent the challenged use is transformative").
19. See, e.g., Cariou v.Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir.2013) (finding that when the
purpose of the use-the first factor of 17 U.S.C. § 106-is found to be transformative, the
remaining three factors of 17 U.S.C.§ 106 are less significant to the overall fair use analy
sis).
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use by using the four factors to determine the following: (1) the
extent to which the given use is transformative and (2) whether
the given use is transformative enough in the given case to quali
fy as fair use.
In order to present a fair use defense, the defendant must have
copied the creative expression of a work with a valid copyright. 20
Only then does the court consider whether the copied material
has been used fairly, in a transformative manner. As both copy
ing and transformation occur at the same time with fair use, it is
little wonder that the doctrine is misunderstood. Perhaps the
most confusing aspect of transformative use is that a source work
may be copied textually and yet transformed contextually. This
sort of transformation is the bailiwick of appropriation artists like
Richard Prince. Such an extreme example of copying as Prince's
The Catcher in the Rye helps to reveal the nature of transforma
tive use, which in turn clarifies the fair use doctrine as a whole.
This comment argues that fair use analysis should be reor
ganized from a disjointed four-factor morass into a straightfor
ward two-part analysis that incorporates and clarifies the pur
pose of each of the four factors. Such a structure recognizes the
role transformative use plays within the fair use doctrine as a
whole. This comment then applies this process to a potential fair
use defense for Richard Prince's The Catcher in the Rye. 2 1 Part I
provides background information on the relationship between the
author, reader, and text as outlined by Roland Barthes, general
copyright law, Richard Prince, and the fabulist Jorge Luis Borges.
Part II analyzes current thinking on the relationship between
transformative use and fair use by focusing on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 2013 decision in Cariou
v. Prince22 and its subsequent criticism by the Seventh Circuit in
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC. 23 Part III lays out a new two-part
method for analyzing fair use based on transformative use and
20. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 698 (1992); see Harper & Row Pub
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (finding that a magazine's use of
"verbatim excerpts from [an] unpublished manuscript was not a fair use").
21. At the time of this writing, no suit has been initiated over Richard Prince's appro
priation of J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
22. 714 F.3d 694.
23. 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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incorporating the four factors, and then applies that method to
Richard Prince's appropriation of J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in
the Rye. This comment concludes by noting that even the total
appropriation of highly creative expression may be a fair use in a
given circumstance if what is copied is contextually transformed.
I. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF 'rHE AUTHOR, THE READER,
AND THE TEXT

Copyright law rewards authors21 for their originality by grant
ing them limited control over the creation and distribution of cop
ies of their original expression. 25 However, the very notion of cop
yright protection recognizes that the progression of science and
the arts is dependent upon dissemination of creative expression
2
to the public. G Creative expression, like so many human endeav
ors, is essentially cumulative. 27 Every text is context, every author
a copyist. These truths concerning the text and the author have
remained at the margins of copyright law even as the artistic
community has embraced them. For the arts, if not for the law,
the reader has replaced the author as the focal point for deter
mining textual meaning. In order to understand fair use, we must
first parse the relationship of author, reader, and text. This rela
tionship underlies fair use as it exists today28 and cries out for a
new method of fair use analysis that acknowledges and explains

24. This comment uses the terms "author," "reader," and "text" with the understand
ing that "author" could refer to any maker of artistic expression (i.e., painters, sculptors,
musicians), "reader" any consumer of artistic expression (i.e., viewers of paintings and
movies), and "text" any artistic expression (i.e., songs, plays, dances).
25. See Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's All Folhs: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Horne Recording
Act of 1991-Merric Melodies or Looney 'Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 147
(1992).
26. See id.
27. See Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Sarne Feminist Lessons for
Copyright Law, 15 Ml. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 207, 265 (2007) (''There is no vacuum
around the creative process, and no wall surrounding the author and her expression. With
her original expression the creative author is entering a cultural conversation that has
been going on Jong before she appeared, and one that will continue Jong after she leaves.
Whatever she adds wilJ therefore incorporate and respond to that which has already been
said; and she must trust that her contribution wilJ inform what others say after }Jer. In
other words, the dialogic nature of authorship reveals the cumulative nature of cultural
creativity.").
28. See infra Part II.
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how, given the right context, a reader may transform an author's
text. 29

A. The Author Is Dead. Long Live the Author!
In 1968 French linguist and philosopher, Roland Barthes, fa
mously declared the author-as the creative genius who gives life
and purpose to the artistic work-dead.30 This declaration was not
meant to suggest that the author-person is no longer necessary,
but rather that the notion of the author as the authority, the ex
plicator, of his own work is outmoded. 31 Every text is copied, an
amalgamation of other texts, such that "it is language which
speaks, not the author."32
It has been argued that while the concept of the death of the
author as promulgated by Barthes and others has had a profound
impact on the study of literature, philosophy, and linguistics, 33 it
has failed to have any noticeable impact on the legal understand
ing of copyright. 34 Whether post-structuralist theory has had any
direct impact on copyright law, the observations made by Barthes
and others still ring true. The author is not dead because a few
French theorists and their students think it so, but rather be
cause the notion of the author as authority over the text makes
little sense. The text is understood by the reader, who becomes
the authority of the text in the act of reading.35 It is in the reader
where meaning must reside. 36 Whether courts realize it or not, the
29. See infra Part III.
30. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 148 (Ste
phen Heath trans., 1977); see Craig, supra note 27, at 216.
31. See Elton Fukumoto, Comment, The Author Effect after the "Death of the Author":
Copyright in a Postmodern Age, 72 WASH. L. REV. 903, 914 (1997) (discussing how authors
have been replaced with text and how text is no longer limited by the figure of the author).
32. BARTHES, supra note 30, at 143.
33. See, e.g., Lionel Bently, Review, Copyright and the Death of the Author in Litera
ture and Law, 57 Mou. L. REV. 973, 974, 977 (1994); Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?,
in TEX'rUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141-42 (Josue
V.Harari ed., 1979).
34. See Bently, supra note 33, at 977.
35. See BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148.
36. See id. ("Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made up of multi
ple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue,
parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that
place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. ... [A] text's unity lies not in its
origin but in its destination.").
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concept of the death of the author meshes with copyright law re
markably well precisely because the goal of promoting progress in
science and the arts recognizes the ascendancy of the text and the
reader over the author.
B. The Author Is Subordinate to the Reader and the Text in
Copyright Law
Though the metes and bounds of copyright law are laid down in
the Copyright Act of 1976, 37 the ultimate legal authority for
American copyright law derives from the United States Constitu
tion, which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ
ings and Discoveries."38 While at first glance this language seems
to have the goal of promoting the rights of authors with respect to
copyright and inventors with respect to patents, upon closer read
ing these rights must instead be understood as a means to an
end, which is the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."39 Once a work is disseminated, progress no longer depends
on the author but instead on the reader, the potential future au
thor.
Copyright law values future creation over past creation. 40 Au
thors have no natural property right in their works; instead, the
government, through the Constitution and the Copyright Act, al
lows them certain limited rights for a certain limited time in or
der to promote artistic innovation at large. 11 The artificial rights
granted to authors are meant to encourage the creation of art, or
rather, more accurately, to not discourage its creation-the

37. See 17 U.S.C § 106 (2012) (setting forth the rights of a copyright owner).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. Id.
40. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that "copyright law promotes O public access to new ideas and concepts").
41. See id. at 1263 ("In a society oriented toward property ownership, it is not surpris
ing to find many that erroneously equate the work with the copyright in the work and con
clude that if one owns the copyright, they must also own the work. However, the fallacy of
that understanding is exposed by the simple fact that the work continues to exist after the
term of the copyright associated with the work has expired. 'The copyright is not a natural
right inherent in authorship. If it were, the impact on market values would be irrelevant;
any unauthorized taking would be obnoxious."') (quoting Leval, supra note 18, at ly.24).
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thought being that, without some sort of reward, much creative
expression might never come into existence.42
While the rights afforded to authors have been extended and
strengthened over the past few decades,43 many of these changes
have come within the context of the new global marketplace and
the necessity of "bring[ing] U.S. copyright law into compliance
with the minimum standards set forth in the Berne Convention,"
the international agreement governing copyright. 44 Furthermore,
the goal of U.S. copyright law has not changed-authors are still
allowed certain limited rights for a certain period of time in order
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 15 The
rights afforded to authors are ensured by U.S. law only in order
to promote new creative expression, new texts, for consumption
by readers. 16 In this way copyright law recognizes that all creative
expression is to some degree an act of appropriation.

C. Richard Prince, Appropriation Artist
Richard Prince first gained the attention of the world in the
1980s with his series of cowboy images which were in reality re
photographs of various well-known Marlboro advertisements, fea
turing the iconic Marlboro Man.·17 The difference between the orig
inal advertisements and Prince's re-photographs were negligible
other than the size and the removal of advertising copy. 18 The ma
jor difference was that Prince's re-photographs were available for
sale and routinely commanded hundreds of thousands of dollars

42. See id. at 1262 ("[T]he Copyright Clause grants the author limited exclusive rights
in order to encourage the creation of original works.").
43. See e.g., ROBER'!' P. MERGES, PETER 8. MENELL & MARKA. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 433 (6th ed. 2012) (stating that since the
Copyright Act was enacted in 1976, the duration of copyright protection has increased
from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years).
44. Id.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. SunTrust Banh, 268 F.3d at 1262.
47. Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use After Cariou v. Prince,
24 DEPAULJ. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 23-24 (2013).
48. Richard Dorment, Richard Prince: The Coolest Artist Alive, TELEGRAPH (July 15,
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3556477/Richard-Prince-the
coolest-artist-alive.html.
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each (and recently, even more). 19 In fact, many of the photographs
that have sold for some of the highest prices at auctions and gal
leries over the past three decades have been re-photographs tak
50
en by Prince.
Despite decades of appropriation, it was not until 2011 that
Richard Prince's art became the business of the courts when pho
tographer Patrick Cariou sued Prince after discovering that he
had appropriated various photographs Cariou had published
years earlier in his book Yes Rasta. 51 While Cariou's book and the
photographs had gone largely unnoticed,52 New York's prominent
Gagosian Gallery was featuring Prince's series Canal Zone, into
which Cariou's photographs had been incorporated, selling eight
of the pieces for a total of $10,480,000. 53 The district court ruled
for Cariou over Prince's defense of fair use, finding that the ap
propriation did not qualify as fair use because the use did not
comment on the original work of art (or seemingly anything as far
51
as the court could tell).
In 2011, while his appeal of the Cariou decision was still in
progress, Richard Prince printed and released The Catcher in the
Rye in an edition of 500 copies. 55 Prince's The Catcher in the Rye
was arguably his boldest appropriation yet, in part because of the
author whose text he had appropriated, but even more so because
5
of the manner and scope of his appropriation. G Prince went out of
his way to make plain the degree of his appropriation, taking the
entire Salinger text and even using the same dust jacket art from

49. In fact one of Prince's re-photographs of a Marlboro advertisement sold for $3.4
million, a record for a photograph at a Sotheby's sale in November of 2007. Brian Appel,
Stealing from the Marlboro Man-Richard Prince's $3.4M Cowboy Re-'l'ahes Top Photog
raphy Spot at the Fall Contemporary Auctions in New Yorh, BRIAN APPEL ART
CHIT! CISM/ART CONSULTING, http://www. brianappelart.com/art_writing_richard_prince_
stealing_from_the_marlboro_man.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
50. See id.
51. Sec Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
52. Id. at 709 (noting that Cariou earned approximately $8000 in royalties from Yes
Rasta).
53. See id. at 698, 709.
54. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55. See Hawk, supra note 2.
56. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. As mentioned above, Salinger has been extremely
protective of his copyright. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see also O'Neill,
supra note 8, at 21-22.
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early editions of The Catcher in the Rye with its iconic red carou
sel horse. 57
Given that Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is so overwhelming
ly similar to Salinger's, it is tempting to simply label it a pirated
copy or a forgery and move on. However, this could not be farther
from the truth. It is not a pirated copy because it is not trying to
pass itself off as a legitimate Salinger The Catcher in the Rye. 68
And it is difficult to claim Prince's book is a forgery because of the
fame of Salinger's book-that is, it is hard to imagine any reason
able person believing that Prince could have been the original au
thor of The Catcher in the Rye. Prince's text, his The Catcher in
the Rye, is not simply the words of the novel itself but the context
in which those words are consumed by the reader. That context
incorporates everything that the reader sees and knows about
both Salinger and Prince, along with the words of the text and
the materials that make up the book. For the reader, the context
of Prince's The Catcher in the Rye overlays Salinger's novel, aug
menting and transforming the meaning of the original text.
D. Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote
In 1939, decades before Richard Prince, the Copyright Act, or
the concept of transformative use existed, the Argentinian Jorge
Luis Borges wrote the short story Pierre Menard, Author of the
Quixote, which illustrated the relationship between author, read
er, and text by focusing on the transformation that occurs
through contextual reading. 59 The story takes the form of a fic
tional piece of literary criticism in which the narrator explains
and extols the creative output of one Pierre Menard, a twentieth
century author whom the narrator knew personally. 60 Menard's

57.
58.

See Goldsmith, supra note 1.

How could it not be trying to pass itself off as a legitimate Salinger The Catcher in
the Rye? Because it is Prince's name, not Salinger's, on the front of the cover, title page,
and copyright page. See id.
59. Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in COLLECTED FICTIONS
88, 88 (Andrew Hurley trans., Penguin Books 1998); Ficciones Characters, BooKI{AGS,

http://www.bookrags.com/studyguide-ficciones/#gsc.tab=O (Apr. 3, 2015).
60. Ficciones Characters, supra note 59. Pierre Menard never existed nor did any of
his works. Notes on "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," BEHOLD MY SWARTHY FACE
(May 12, 2008, 12:33 AM), http://www.beholdmyswarthyface.com/2008/05/on-pierre-men
ard-author-of-quixote-by.html.
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greatest ambition, it seems, was to write the Quixote. 61 That Mi
guel de Cervantes had already written it 250 years earlier was of
no matter; Menard was determined to produce it himself word for
word. 62 Even more astonishing than this, Menard intended to
write the Quixote, not by copying it or by somehow channeling
Cervantes, but by writing as himself, a quirky, twentieth century
French author. 63 According to the narrator, Menard seems to have
succeeded. At one point in his encomium, the narrator compares
Cervantes' Don Quixote to Menard's and finds the latter's very
different from and far superior to the farmer's:
Cervantes, for example, wrote the following (Part I, Chapter IX):
... truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the pre
sent, and the future's counselor.
This catalog of attributes, written in the seventeenth century ... is
mere rhetorical praise of history.Menard, on the other hand, writes:
... truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the pre
sent, and the future's counselor.
History, the mother of truth!-the idea is staggering.Menard, a con
temporary of William James, defines history not as delving into real
61
ity but as the very fount of reality.

According to the narrator, the genius of Menard's Don Quixote
derived from its context. Though Menard writes the same words
as Cervantes, by presenting them as his own, he forces the narra
tor to confront those words in a different context than he would
Cervantes' original text. 65 Laid over the Cervantes' Don Quixote,
the narrator sees and reads the world of Menard (a twentieth
century world).
The reader of Borges' story may well be unable to suspend his
disbelief enough to agree with the narrator. However, the student
61. Borges, supra note 59, at 91.
62. Id. ("Pierre Menard did not want to compose another Quixote ... he wanted to
compose the Quixote. Nor, surely, need one be obliged to note that his goal was never a
mechanical transcription of the original; he had no intention of copying it. His admirable
ambition was to produce a number of pages which coincided-word for word and line for
line-with those of Miguel de Cervantes.").
63. See id. at 91-92.
64. Id. at 94.
65. Id. ("The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the se
cond is almost infinitely richer.").
/
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of copyright should take note that, if the story is to be believed, 66
and if Cervantes (somehow) maintained a valid copyright at the
time of Menard's composition, Menard would not have infringed
on that copyright. The Quixote as written by Menard would be an
original creation and not a copy.67
Regardless of his intent, Menard's composition would not quali
fy as an example of appropriation art. Despite the fact that
Menard appears to be very familiar with Cervantes and Don
Quixote, he steadfastly denied copying. 68 Either Menard is a liar/
forger or he is an independent creator. Appropriation art is a
bald-faced act; the appropriation artist openly incorporates the
texts he finds into his own text without consideration of author
ship claims.69 Nonetheless, the Borges story does reveal the sur
prising relationship between author, reader, and text that appro
priation artists like Richard Prince seek to expose: that authors
lose authority once the texts are on the page. In fact, authors be
come little more than additional pieces of context for the consum
er of art to interpret in the course of his reading.

IL

THE STATE OF FAIR USE

For well over one hundred years, courts have implemented the
doctrine of fair use to protect a certain degree of copying in order
to promote the overall purpose of copyright-"to promote the Pro
gress of Science and useful Arts."70 In keeping with the goals of
copyright protection, to disseminate and to increase cultural
knowledge and expression, fair use provides the courts with a
way to ensure that authors who use the protected creative ex
pressions
of others may do so if their use leads to new works of
•
expression.71

66. That is, that Menard did not copy Cervantes' Quixote but independently created a
literary double. See id. at 91.
67. See Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of
Copyright Vis-a-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 216-17 & n.51.
68. See Borges, supra note 59, at 91.
69. See Rachel Isabelle Butt, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 Omo ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1055, 1061 (2010).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994).
71. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Copyright law thus must ad
dress the inevitable tension between the property rights it establishes in creative
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Since its development in the nineteenth century, the fair use
doctrine has tracked the course of copyright law development,
and it was codified into the Copyright Act of 1976.72 The statute
lists four factors that courts must use in any fair use analysis:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos
es;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
73
the copyrighted work.

Courts are reluctant to clarify and organize these factors out of
concern that doing so would limit their discretion over fair use de
terminations.11 This reluctance causes courts to maintain a form
less mode of analysis in which the fair use factors have been ap
plied haphazardly. What is more, in the last twenty-five years,
the concept of transformative use has confused fair use analysis
even further. The current state of fair use and its relationship to
transformative use are quagmires that require explanations.
A. Fair Use as (Mostly) 1'ransformative Use?
In 1990, Pierre Leval, a federal district court judge, wrote what
has become a seminal article on copyright law, in which he
pushed for a more standardized conception of the fair use doc
trine.75 Leval claimed that "Factor One is the soul of fair use," and
that in reality, factor one is really asking whether a given use is
transformative. 76 Though Leval argued that all four of the factors
are necessary to complete any fair use analysis, he also stated
that the three final factors would necessarily vary in significance
works ... and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to express them-or our
selves by reference to the works of others .... The fair-use doctrine mediates between the
se two sets of interests, determining where each set of interests ceases to control.").
72. See 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
73. Id.
74. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Ca.mp
bell, 510 U.S.at 577 (citations omitted).
75. See genera.Uy Leval, supra. note 18, at 1105 (noting "that throughout the develop
ment of the fair use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or
values," while "[suggesting] that a cogent set of governing principles exists").
76. Id. at 1116.
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depending on the strength of the transformative use determined
under the first factor.77
Leval's take on fair use and, particularly, the concept of trans
formative use under the first factor, was itself transformed into
legal precedent by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music in 1994. 78 However, the first factor has not always been
considered the most important of the four. Despite the powerful
influence of Leval's article and the Supreme Court's decision in
Campbell, some courts continue to agree with the earlier Su
preme Court decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na
tions, 79 in which the Court stated that the "last factor is undoubt
edly the single most important element of fair use."80 Nonetheless,
in the years since the Campbell decision, most courts have taken
an "expansive view of transformative use" and frequently found
that it can "essentially overwhelm all the [other] factors."8 1
B. Fair Use and Transformative Use in (and After) Cariou v.
Prince
The Second Circuit's decision in Cariou v. Prince represents the
most current distillation of the role transformation plays in fair
use determinations. 82 In this case, the court found that Prince's
use of the Cariou photographs was transformative83 and therefore
fair because that use added value to the original photographs by
employing them for a different purpose. 8·1 Though the Second Cir77. See id.
78. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("(T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copy
right, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of the
other factors . . . that may weigh against a finding of fair use.") (internal citations omit
ted).
79. See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We
think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is the
fourth (market effect).").
80. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
81. Barry Werbin & Jessica D. Wessel, The 'Transformation' of Fair Use After Prince
v. Cariou, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/292912/Copyright/'l'he+Tran
sfo�mation+of+Fair+Use+After+Prince+v+Cariou (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
82. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
83. The court found the use transformative in twenty-five out of thirty works. Id. at
706. On the remaining five works, it remanded the case to the district court for a finding
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 712.
84. Se id. at 705-06.
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cuit's emphasis on transformative use seems a step in the right
direction, it is not without its detractors. In its 2014 decision in
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the Seventh Circuit criticized the
Cariou court for replacing the four factors with the notion of
transformative use.85 These two cases highlight the current mis
understanding of the concept of transformative use as it relates to
the four factors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106. By considering the four
factors together as indicators of transformation and not as dis
crete inquiries, courts could significantly reduce this confusion.
In the course of his legal defense, Richard Prince never disput
ed that he had appropriated and used Patrick Cariou's copyright
86
ed work. As an appropriation artist, he made no effort to conceal
his "theft" nor felt he had any reason to do so. 87 Prince did, how
ever, mount a fair use defense. 88 Though the district court roundly
rejected Prince's fair use defense, the Second Circuit largely ac
cepted it when it considered the case on appeal in 2013. 89 The Se
cond Circuit mainly disagreed with the district court over the ap
plication of the first of the four factors in the fair use analysis.
While the district court "imposed a requirement that, to qualify
for a fair use defense, a secondary use must 'comment on, relate
to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original
works,"' the Second Circuit disagreed.90 While it acknowledged
that often times fair use will come in the form of a reflexive com
mentary-especially when it involves satire or parody-the Se
cond Circuit found the requirement that a use come in that form
in order to qualify as transformative was incorrect.01 Instead, the

85. See 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). This is an extreme and unfair criticism on
the part of the Seventh Circuit. While the Second Circuit certainly emphasized transform
ative use in Cariou, it still only treated it under factor one of the four factor test. Cariou,
714 F.3d at 708-10. Though the court subordinated the other factors to factor one and
transformative use, it still considered all four in its analysis. Id.
86. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
87. See Interview by Karen Rosenberg with Richard Prince, N.Y. MAG. (May 2, 2005),
available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/art/11815/ (referring to images he might like
to appropriate Prince remarked, "Every week, I'd see one and be like, 'Oh, that's mine.
Thank you."') (emphasis added).
88. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
89. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698-99.
90. Id. at 706 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348).
91. Id.
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secondary use must merely "alter the original with 'new expres
sion, meaning, or message"' without simply repackaging or re•
•
castmg 1t. 9')
In order to determine whether a new message, meaning, or ex
pression has been created in the secondary work, the court must
first look at the original and secondary works side by side. 93 A
simple comparison of their aesthetics might suffice to show that a
different message or a different purpose is being expressed de
spite the use of the same materials. 91 In Cariou, the Second Cir
cuit found that this eyeball test revealed that there were dra
matic differences of aesthetics between Cariou's originals and
their Prince counterparts in twenty-five out of thirty of the piec
es.% In short, the Second Circuit determined that, while criticism
and commentary on the original could qualify as transformative
use (and therefore fair use), they were not requirements.% In
stead, all that was required was actual transformation of the
•
meanmg or message. 97
In its analysis, the district court relied heavily on Prince to ex
plain the message of his art and found that he was unable to ar
ticulate a clear purpose for his use of Cariou's photographs.98 The
Second Circuit once again thought the district court missed the
mark in emphasizing the role of the author in determining the
meaning of his own work. 99 Perhaps unknowingly influenced by
Barthes and other poststructuralists, the court found what was
essential to determining that purpose was not the explication of
the artist but rather "how the work in question appears to the
reasonable observer." 100 The Second Circuit interestingly shifted
92. Id. (quoting Campbell v.Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.569, 579 (1994)).
93. See id. at 706-08.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 706 ("Prince's composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media are
fundamentally different and new compared to the [Cariou] photographs, as is the expres
sive nature of Prince's work.").
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 707 ("[W]hat I [Prince] do is I completely try to change it into something
that's completely different ... I'm trying to make a kind of fantastic, absolutely hip, up to
date, contemporary take on the music scene.") (quoting Prince Dep. 338:4-339:3, Oct. 6,
2009).
99. See id.
100. See id.; cf. BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148 ("[A] text is made of multiple writ
ings ...but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the read-
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the inquiry from intention to perception and from the author to
the reader. By doing so, the court made a significant change to
the process of finding transformative use.
In a telling move, the Second Circuit next analyzed the Prince
Canal Zone works under the fourth fair use factor,101 again find
ing that the district court had focused its attention in the wrong
102
place. The point of the fourth factor, according to the Second
Circuit, was not to determine whether the secondary use sup
pressed or destroyed the market for the original (say by damaging
the original artist's reputation), "but whether the secondary use
usurps the market of the original work." 103 In order to usurp the
market of the original, the court reasoned that the secondary
work must hijack the likely audience of the original work by pre
senting that audience with the same content as that original
work.Jo.,
Because Prince's market for his Canal Zone pieces was com
pletely different from Cariou's market for his Yes Rasta photo
graphs, the court found that there was no way that Prince could
have been said to have usurped the market (even the derivative
market) for Cariou's work.105 The potential audience and likely
consumers of Prince's Canal Zone were the rich, sophisticated col
lectors who were wined and dined at the Gagosian Gallery. JoG
Whereas Cariou published his photographs in book form, sold a
few prints to close friends, and hardly marketed his work at all,
making just over $8000, Prince sold eight of his works for a total
of $10,480,000 and the opening of his show was attended by a
who's who of the rich and famous, including Jay-Z, Beyonce, Tom
Brady, Gisele Bi.indchen, Jonathan Franzen, Candance Bushnell,
107
Robert DeNiro, Brad Pitt, and Angelina Jolie. It simply does not

er, not, as was hitherto said, the author.").
101. This is "telling'' because the court is revealing what has long been the thinking of
the courts-that the focus of the fair use analysis should be on either the first factor, the
fourth factor, or both, and not on the middle two factors.
102. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
103. Id. (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006)).
104. Id. at 709.
105. See id.
106. See id. The Gagosian Gallery is the gallery where Prince exhibited and sold his
Canal Zone pieces. Richard Prince Canal Zone, GAGOSIAN GALLERY, http://www.gagosian.
com/exhibitions/richard-prince--may-08-2014 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
107. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
/
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take much imagination to see that, forgetting the respective artis
tic merits of the Yes Rasta and Canal Zone pieces, the market for
the relatively unknown Patrick Cariou was very different from
that of the famous and notorious Richard Prince whose previous
work, by the time of this show, held the record for the highest re
alized price of any photograph in history. 108 Prince's fame ensured
that his work could reach a market that Cariou simply could not.
The Second Circuit rounded out its analysis with brief consid
eration of the second and third fair use factors-the nature of the
copyrighted work (factor two) and the amount and substantiality
of the work that is used (factor three). 109 It acknowledged that the
second factor was designed to make it more difficult to find fair
use when the original work was of a highly creative nature. 110
Although Cariou's photographs were just the sort of highly crea
tive works that copyright law is designed to protect, the court
shrugged this off, finding this factor of limited help when the sec
ondary use has already been shown to be transformative. 111 The
court gave the third fair use factor similar treatment, finding that
however much the secondary work takes from the original, so
long as the use is transformative, the factor must nonetheless
weigh in favor of fair use. 112
Ultimately, in determining that the use of Cariou's photo
graphs in twenty-five out of thirty of Prince's Canal Zone pieces
qualified as fair use, the Second Circuit focused on two issues: (1)
the transformative use of the photographs (the first fair use fac
tor) and (2) the fact that the secondary works did not usurp the
market of the originals (the fourth fair use factor). 113 While the
court considered all four of the factors demanded by the Copy
right Act, in its analysis it misunderstood how the four factors re
late to each other and how they all (not just the first factor) help
reveal the role of transformative use in a finding of fair use.
The general confusion over fair use was again on display in a
subsequent decision by the Seventh Circuit in 2014, wherein the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Appel, supra note 49.
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709-10.
See id. at 709.
See id. at 710.
See id.
See id. at 705-06, 709-10.

2015)

1311

TRANSFORMING FAIR USE ANALYSIS

court criticized the Second Circuit for improperly allowing a find
ing of transformative use to usurp the role of the four factors in
its Cariou v. Prince decision. 114 According to the Seventh Circuit,
hearkening back to the Supreme Court's language in Harper &
Row, all of the factors should be considered, with the fourth factor
being the most important. 115 Indeed, as far as the Seventh Circuit
was concerned, transformative use. was "not one of the statutory
factors" at all despite the significance that the Supreme Court
seemed to place on it in Campbell. 116
This circuit split highlights the current confusion as to the in
terrelationship of the four factors and the overall significance of
transformative use. The problem is that each court is right and
each court is wrong. The Kienitz court correctly points out that
transformative use is not one of the four statutory factors which
must be considered in any fair use analysis. 117 However, the court
does not recognize that transformative use is the unifying theme
behind those factors, the question that they help to resolve, and
the sine qua non of fair use. The Cariou court understands that
transformative use is essential but misunderstands its place in
the analysis. The court considers it only under the first factor and
then systematically marginalizes the other factors without realiz
ing that they are necessary to understanding the nature and ex
tent of the transformative use at issue. This confusion can be
remedied by the two-step method for analyzing fair use described
below that harmonizes the four factors and clarifies their rela
tionship to transformative use.
III. THE FUTURE OF FAIR USE
Though allowing the courts broad discretion to find fair use
makes sense considering the rich variety of creative expression
mankind is capable of, a standardized process for determining
fair use is necessary in order to uphold the purpose of copyright
the progress of science and the arts. The current methods of fair

114.
115.
(1985).
116.
(1994).
117.

See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
See id. at 758; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 589, 566
See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
/
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use analysis are confusing and have led to incompatible rulings.
The method itself may be standardized without undermining the
courts discretion within that method. Fair use should be deter
mined by considering the four factors as reorganized into two
questions: (1) How transformative is a given use? and (2) Is that
use transformative enough in a given case to be considered fair
use? An analysis of Richard Prince's complete appropriation of
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, a seemingly extreme example
of what might be considered fair use, serves well as a template for
applying this proposed method.
A. Transforming Fair Use
First and foremost, all use is transformative. Copyright law
has danced around this idea ever since the fair use doctrine was
articulated without directly proclaiming it. 118 Courts have long
recognized that "[t]he thoughts of every man are, more or less, a
combination of what other men have thought and expressed, alt
hough they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own ge
nius or reflection."119 Barthes' concept of the text as a web of in
terconnected texts, drawn from language and culture, is not new
to copyright law. 120 To a degree, it has always been there. The fair
use doctrine recognizes this by allowing authors who have incor
porated copied creative expression into their works an opportuni
ty to show that their copying is not at odds with the goal of copy
right-the progress of science and art. 121
Given that all use is transformative, the four factors may now
be understood as signposts for determining the extent of the
transformation that has occurred and, ultimately, whether that
transformation has removed the secondary work from the market
of the original. To that end, rather than wandering through the
four factors, occasionally conflating them, overemphasizing one
and disregarding another, courts should apply a standard prac118. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (1845) ("In truth, in literature, in sci
ence and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout.").
119. Id.
120. See id. (discussing the manner in which all books borrow from elsewhere); see also
BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148 ("[A] text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many
cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation ....").
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); supra Part LB.
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tice to their application. This can be accomplished by changing
the stratagem for fair use analysis from a four factor pick-and
choose into a methodical two-step process. A court should first
ask how transformative the use is. In answering that question, it
should consider the amount and significance of the material used
122
(factor three) and the purpose of the use (factor one). A court
should then ask whether that use is transformative enough in the
work in question to qualify as fair use. In answering that ques
tion, it should consider the nature of the copyrighted work (factor
two) and whether the use has allowed the secondary work to
usurp the potential market of the copyrighted work (factor
12
four). 3
Additionally, when determining the purpose of the use under
the first question, the courts should follow the example of the Se
cond Circuit in Cariou v. Prince and not concern itself with the
motivations of the author but instead with the observer's percep
tion of the use's purpose.121 However, rather than the general rea
sonable observer standard set forth in Cariou, the court should
consider the purpose of the use from the perspective of a reasona
125
ble consumer of the allegedly infringing worh. In this way, the
court can limit the analysis to the likely audience of the text ra
ther than the reasonable public at large. After all, it is the con
sumer of any given creative expression, the reader of a text, who
126
is actually interpreting and understanding it.
B. From The Catcher in the Rye to The Catcher in the Rye
As of this writing, the Salinger estate has taken no legal action
against Richard Prince for his appropriation of The Catcher in the
Rye. 121 It may never. After all, Richard Prince only produced 500

122. See 17 U.S.C.§ 107.
12 3. See id.; Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708-09 (2d Cir. 201 3) (finding that the
fourth factor is really about whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original).
124. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
125. See id. ("What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable
observer ....").
126. See BARTHES, supra note 30, at 148.
127. See Goldsmith, supra note 1 ("Price [sic] is openly pirating what is arguably the
most valuable literary property [in] American literature, practically begging the estate of
Salinger to sue him.").
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copies. 128 As many of the copies have disappeared into collections
and the secondary market, 129 an injunction would be somewhat
unhelpful. 130 Damages or some sort of reasonable royalties might
be possible, but it may not be worth it to the estate considering
the retail prices of the Prince copies. 131 Nonetheless, an analysis of
such a blatant appropriation of such a renowned creative work
under the proposed two question fair use analysis described below
illustrates the helpfulness of the process.
1. How Transformative Is Richard Prince's Use of J.D. Salinger's
The Catcher in the Rye?
In order to understand the extent of the transformative use of
The Catcher in the Rye, we must determine (1) the amount and
significance of the portion used and (2) the purpose of the use. 132
Richard Prince appropriated every word of the text of Salin
ger's novel in the making of his The Catcher in the Rye. Prince
additionally used the same dust jacket art and used materials de
signed to mimic an early edition of Salinger's novel, hijacking the
context of the book as an object.133 Under the first consideration, it
128. Michael Lieberman, Richard Prince: Book Pirate?, BOOK PATROL (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://bookpatrol.net/richard-prince-book-pirate/.
129. On the popular used and rare book marketplace abebooks.com, as of this writing,
unsigned copies of Prince's The Catcher in the Rye start at $1500. See Results for Richard
Prince and The Catcher in the Rye, ABEBOOI<S.COM, http://abebooks.com/servlet/Search
Results?an=richard+prince&sts=t&m=catcher+in+the+rye (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
130. Prince sold an unknown number of copies on the street in New York and still more
at a rare book convention; the rest remain in his archive. Kelly Crow, Artist Richard
Prince's Secret Retreat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/artist
richard-princes-secret-retreat-1417536346. Prince seems to have stopped selling copies
and keeps the unsold copies in his archive. See id. An injunction could reach these unsold
copies, prevent Prince from reprinting his appropriation, and discourage third party sales
on the secondary market. But still, Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is out in the world; an
injunction is unlikely to change that.
131. There is some question as to what constituted retail price for the Prince books.
Prince seems to have sold some on the street for forty dollars apiece on at least one occa
sion. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. However, the price in the dust jacket was sixty-two dol
lars, so some may have sold for that price. See Interview by Kim Gordon with Richard
Prince, lNTERVmW MAG., av.ailable at http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/kim-gordon
richard-prince/#_ (quoting Prince as saying that he thought the price on the flap was sixty
two dollars).
132. See supra Part III.A; cf 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
133. See Goldsmith, supra note 1. Though the design of the book and jacket are not Sal
inger's direct creative expressions, they are so heavily associated with the work that they
must be considered as part of the context surrounding the text, though not ultimately as
material copied from Salinger.
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is hard to argue that Prince left a single creative expression
alone. However, appropriating all of the creative expression of
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye does not weigh against Prince
in determining the extent of his transformative use of the materi
al. Instead, it lets us know where to look for transformation.
Here, as Prince appropriated everything from the original, in the
next step, we must look at the allegedly infringing text as a whole
for transformation.
Having determined that Prince appropriated everything from
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, we must next determine the
purpose of that complete use. In order to determine this purpose,
we do not need to focus our attention on the purported meaning
ascribed to the use by Prince.131 Instead, we should consider how
the use would appear to a reasonable, likely observer of that
use. 135 While it is difficult to tell "how a presumably befuddled
public might have responded" to Prince's work, 136 those who know
of Prince, and even appropriation art in general, would almost
certainly recognize the use as "a new appropriation work ... so
radical and so daring." 137 This is largely because of the text that
Prince is appropriating and the notoriety of Prince himself.
Because of the sheer fame of Salinger's work, it is doubtful that
any likely consumer of either Salinger or Prince would think that
Prince's The Catcher in the Rye is the original novel. Salinger's
The Catcher in the Rye is one of the bestselling and most recog
nizable novels of all time. 138 The mere presence of Prince's name
134. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013). As it happens, in an inter
view with Kim Gordon, Prince did state a purpose for appropriating The Catcher in the
Rye:
Yeah, I just wanted to make sure, if you were going to buy my Catcher in the
Rye, you were going to have to pay twice as much as the one Barnes and No
ble was selling from J.D. Salinger. I know that sounds really kind of shallow,
and maybe that's not the best way to contribute to something, but in the book
collecting world you pay a premium for really collectible books.
Interview by Kim Gordon with Richard Prince, supra note 131. Again, the purpose as ar
ticulated by Prince is not what is important here. The purpose as interpreted by the read
er is what matters.
135. Cf. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
136. Goldsmith, supra note 1.
137. Id.
138. The novel has sold some sixty million copies and is widely known for its inclusion
on school required reading lists. Ed Grabianowski, The 21 Best-Selling Books of All Time,
ENTrmTAINMENT: HowSTUFFWORKS, http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/arts/litera
ture/21-best-sellers.htm#page=15 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (ranking The Catcher in the
I
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on the cover, title page, and (even) the copyright page of such a
renowned novel reveals the purpose to be appropriation itself.
The purpose of Prince's use is to comment on the nature of the
authorship and copyright restrictions by appropriating one of the
most famous and subversive novels of the twentieth century, a
work by an author known to be protective of his copyright. 139
By replacing Salinger's name with his own, Prince has radical
ly transformed the text from a novel about the alienation of an
adolescent from the hypocritical world in which he finds himself
to a visual protest against the tyranny of authorship. Written
over and into Salinger's text is Prince's creation of an object
which, by its very existence, encapsulates a refusal to
acknowledge authority-a refusal made all the more powerful
considering Holden Caulfield's rejection of adult authority in the
11
novel. 0 Prince's The Catcher in the Rye as a piece of art reflects
the rebellion exhibited in the novel back at Salinger and the pu.b
lic at large.
It is important to note that it is not simply Prince's notoriety as
an appropriator of visual art, the novelty of his appropriation,
Salinger's fame and obsession with privacy, or the novel's theme
and reputation that reveals the purpose of the use here. Rather,
it is the combination of all of these things. Prince's text is not
simply the novel The Catcher in the Rye but also a sculpture (in
the form of a book) which criticizes the hypocrisy of authority and
copyright protectionism. It is the total appropriation of the Salin
ger novel which gives life to this use. As such, the use of the novel
as a whole is highly transformative.
2. Is Prince's Use Transformative Enough in This Case to
Qualify as Fair Use?
In order to determine whether Prince's use is transformative
enough in this particular case to qualify as fair use we must con
sider: (1) the nature of the copyrighted work and (2) whether the

Rye as the fifteenth bestselling book of all time).
139. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
140. See Louis Menand, Holden at Fifty, NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http:
//www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/10/0l/holden-at-fifty.
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use has allowed the secondary work to usurp the market of the
copyrighted work. 111
Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye is a highly creative work of
expression that is exactly the sort of work copyright law was de
signed to encourage. However, this does not mean that use of it
cannot be fair. The nature of the copyrighted work helps to de
termine what its market is and where it rests in the cultural
world. As an extremely popular and highly original novel, its
markets and derivative markets are easy enough to determine:
sales of the novel itself, potential sequels, movies, facsimile edi
tions, etc.
While the first consideration, the nature of the copyrighted
work, helps to determine the market for the original, the second
consideration asks us to decide whether the transformative use
allows the secondary work to usurp the market of the original.
Under this analysis some concerns arise-namely whether the
Prince work usurps the facsimile market for the original and
whether it usurps the regular book market for the original.
It is easy to dispense with the concern about the market for
facsimile editions. Prince has made a near copy of an early edi
tion; still, it is not a facsimile edition for the simple reason that a
facsimile edition is a complete copy of a book including the words
1
of the novel and the original points of issue for the book. 12 A fac
simile edition perfectly copies the book as a whole, not just the
text of the novel. By adding his name to the cover, title, and copy
right pages (as well as changing the publishing information on
the copyright page), Prince has prevented his work from usurping
the facsimile market for the original because it is not a perfect
copy of any edition of The Catcher in the Rye.
The second concern for market usurpation is somewhat more at
issue here. After all, Prince was out on the sidewalk in New York
141. See supra Part III.A.
142. Facsimile Editions, ABEB00KS.C0M, http://www.abebooks.com/books/RareDooks/
collection-expensive-reprint-publisher/facsimile-editions.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
A point of issue is a bibliographic indicator of a certain edition. See How to Establish the
Value of a Booh, FEDPO.C0M, www.fedpo.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). For instance,
very early printings of The Catcher in the Rye have a photograph of Salinger on the rear
panel of the dust jacket. See First Edition Criteria and Points to Identify The Catcher and
the Rye by J.D. Salinger, supra note 2. This was dropped in later printings and as such is
a point of issue for certain early printings of the work. See id.
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selling his copies of the work for forty dollars apiece, a price not
all that different from what a new hardcover copy of Salinger's
The Catcher in the Rye might command.w It might seem reasona
ble that a person wanting to read the original could just as easily
purchase a Prince copy. However, this is unlikely. A typical read
er, unfamiliar with appropriation art and Richard Prince, who
wants to read The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger is unlikely
to purchase a copy of The Catcher in the Rye by Richard Prince.
Such a person would not believe two books by different authors
would have the same text. The market for Prince's The Catcher in
the Rye is not the reading public or the Salinger collector, but ra
ther the collector of appropriation art or bibliographic oddities.
Prince's work is unlikely to replace Salinger's in the novel reading
market and/or its derivative markets and therefore does not
usurp the market for the original work.
As the transformative use of Salinger's complete novel has re
moved Prince's The Catcher in the Rye from the market for the
original, that transformative use must qualify as fair use under
the analysis. Therefore, Richard Prince's The Catcher in the Rye
does not infringe on J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye.
CONCLUSION

Though courts have long had all the pieces of the fair use doc
trine, the analyses have shown a remarkable degree of confusion
over the years. Courts have consistently misunderstood the role
of transformative use and its relationship to the four factors the
Copyright Act requires for consideration in any fair use determi
nation. If all art is cumulative and all expression is in some way
copied, courts must be very careful in their determinations of
what does and does not constitute fair use. It is the last line of de
fense against infringement; the final protection not only for the
allegedly infringing work but also for all the possible works it
might influence. With their uneven applications of the four fair

143. The copy could command this price if Salinger's estate allowed it to be reprinted in
hardcover. See generally Price and Inflation Data for Selected Library Materials 2014,
STATF� LIB. OF IOWA, www.statelibraryofiowa.org/ld/a-b/books/resources/bookinflation (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015) (showing that the average price of a hardcover novel in 2013 was
$30.18).

2015]

TRANSFORMING FAIR USE ANALYSIS

1319

use factors, the courts have endangered the progress of the sci
ence and the arts.
In order to clarify and organize the process of finding fair use,
this comment suggests structuring the four factor test into a two
part analysis that asks: (1) how transformative a given use is and
(2) whether that use is transformative enough to qualify as fair
use in a given case. By providing a solid structure for applying
the four factors and clarifying the role transformative use plays
in every fair use analysis, courts can ensure that the ultimate
purpose of copyright is not sacrificed on the altar of the author's
rights. As seen in Richard Prince's total appropriation of J.D. Sal
inger's The Catcher in the Rye, even complete copying can be fair
use if that copying transforms the original enough contextually in
the minds of its readers.
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